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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the established literature both on the side of fiscal 
consolidation (for e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1995; Alesina et al. 2010) and that of aid supplies 
(for e.g. Mosley 1985; Faini, 2006) by investigating the effects of fiscal episodes in OECD 
donor countries on their aid effort vis-à-vis the developing countries. We use descriptive 
statistics provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on episodes of fiscal consolidation and 
stimuli in OECD countries and regression models to perform this analysis. The study is 
performed on a sample of 19 OECD DAC countries as well as on sub-samples for robustness 
check and over the period 1970-2007. Overall, the results suggest that the episodes of fiscal 
consolidation and the size of these fiscal austerity policies in OECD DAC countries lead to the 
curtailment of aid effort. Whilst during periods of fiscal expansion, aid expenditures 
increase, the size of these fiscal expansion policies may have an opposite effect.  
The fiscal austerity measures currently adopted by OECD DAC countries are likely to 
result in aid shortfalls to developing countries, with these effects likely be higher in the 
“Like-minded Donor countries”.  
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1. Introduction 
In response to the largest post-war recession, OECD governments have run up record 
peacetime budget deficits. The recent financial crisis has constrained them to embark on 
major fiscal stimulus in order to rescue their financial institutions and the ensuing Great 
Recession. As a result, budget deficits and government debt soared, leading to a substantial 
deterioration of their fiscal situations.  
Actions to design and implement “exits” from fiscal stimulus become imperative and 
prompt countries to adopt fiscal consolidation measures in order to make their public finances 
sustainable. Furthermore, population ageing could create on the medium to long-run pressures 
on public finances that adds to the fiscal consolidation effort.  
 While there is an ongoing debate about the best balance between cuts in expenditure 
and rises in tax during episodes of fiscal consolidation, several empirical studies (Alesina and 
Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996), IMF (1996), OECD (1997) and 
Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna 1998, Ardagna 2007, Alesina and Ardagna 2010, IMF 
2010) tend to convey the same message: “fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on spending 
cuts on transfers and the government wage bill have a better chance of being successful and 
are expansionary. By contrast, fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on tax increases and 
cuts in public investment tend not to last and are contractionary”. However, Heylen and 
Everaert (2000) empirically contest the result according to which current expenditures 
reductions are the best policy to get a successful fiscal consolidation. 
On the side of fiscal expansions, Alesina and Perotti (1995a) find evidence that fiscal 
expansions typically occur through increases in expenditures. More recently, Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) also find evidence that fiscal stimuli based on tax cuts are more likely to 
increase growth than those based upon spending increases. 
In view of all these different empirical results, one can question whether fiscal episodes in 
donors’ governments do not affect aid supply. Indeed, it is likely that during fiscal consolidation 
episodes where government expenditures will likely be curtailed, development aid supplies by 
the OECD DAC countries that constitute a category of government expenditures will also be 
reduced. Similarly, we can also expect donors’ governments to increase aid expenditures 
during fiscal stimuli years as the other categories of government spending rise. At the same 
time, these OECD DAC countries have committed either individually or collectively (through 
international meetings) to achieve a target level of aid flows granted to developing countries, 
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commitments that have been renewed at the Gleneagles summit. In 2010, the OECD has 
estimated that at least USD 10-15 billion must still be added to the forward spending plans if 
donors, are to meet their 2010’s commitments. However, during the same year, the OECD has 
communicated (on 14th April 2010) that Africa will not likely receive more than the USD 11 
billion over the USD 25 billion promised at the Gleneagles summit, due to the adjustment 
measures adopted by the country members in response to the recent financial and economic 
crisis.  
The figures1 reported in table 1 show evidence that over the period 1970-2007, on 
average, only four countries (Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have achieved, 
even exceed the international ODA target of 0.7% of GNI. These results suggest that several 
variables affect the decisions of donors to supply aid and may explain why many of them do 
not fulfil their ODA commitments. In this paper, we explore the role of fiscal episodes in 
explaining this phenomenon. 
As we will see later, the empirical literature has already established that recipient-
country characteristics such as income level, population, and political system (see for e.g. 
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2006) affect aid inflows. However, the empirical 
literature on the donor-side’s determinants of aid, especially the one that focuses on the fiscal 
variables remains short and inconclusive. For example, Faini (2006) finds evidence that 
higher budget deficit and higher stock of public debt reduce aid, whereas Round and 
Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find no significant relationship between 
deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these studies explore the effects that the fiscal 
episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. 
In this paper, we investigate how donors behave in terms of aid supplies during the 
fiscal episodes. In other words, we explore the effects of fiscal consolidation and stimuli 
episodes in OECD donor countries’ aid supplies, irrespective of their effect on per capita 
income and other economic and political variables. We follow the literature on fiscal episodes 
and use descriptive statistics and regression models to perform this analysis.       
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section (II), we provide a literature 
survey on the topic. We then explain how the fiscal episodes in OECD countries are 
determined (III). In section IV, we present our empirical model. Section V discusses the data 
                                                          
1
 Figures are computed by the Author using the OECD’s Statistics on Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Gross National Income (GNI). 
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and econometric methodology and section VI presents empirical results. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review  
Several, though controversial studies have been conducted on the supply of foreign 
aid, with most of them relying on how recipients’ characteristics affect aid delivery. These 
studies examine the potential factors and motivations behind the supply of aid by answering 
questions such as: Who received aid? How much is received and for what kinds of activities? 
Many of them find evidence that donors’ political, economic and strategic interests appear to 
dominate altruistic and development-centered motivations in their foreign aid programs. For 
example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) use bilateral data on DAC countries over 1970-1994 and 
find evidence that factors such as colonial ties and strategic considerations (i.e. proxied by the 
degree of correlation in the donor and recipient countries’ voting records at the UN) are 
among the factors that could influence the flow of bilateral aid.  
However, limited studies have dealt with the supply side determinants of aid flows 
from the donor’s perspective (that is, the determinants of “aid effort” or “aid generosity”). For 
example, the focus of these studies on how macroeconomic variables (and especially fiscal 
policy ones) can affect theoretically and empirically aid generosity remains scarce: Beenstock 
1980; Mosley 1985; Faini (2006) and more recently Sam (2011) have been the few authors 
that explore both theoretically and empirically the determinants of aid supplies. We present 
here the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue. 
2.1 The theoretical literature review on the determinants of aid supply 
Beenstock (1980) developed a statistical model that sheds light on the political 
decision-making process regarding the allocation of aid by OECD countries and where the 
latter depends among others on the level of unemployment, the budget balance, the balance of 
payments, the Gross National Product, the level of population. After estimating his model on 
alternatively 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US, the Netherlands and Sweden) and 
6 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) over the period 1960-1976 (T=17 
Years), he finds evidence that Aid flows are negatively and significantly affected by the 
unemployment level, the population level, and the net budget surplus, whereas it is positively 
affected by the balance-of-payments, the GNP, and a time trend.  
The theoretical model on Aid flows determinants developed by Mosley (1985) relies 
on the Breton (1974)’s approach to market adjustment in the case of goods provided by the 
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public sector. He treats aid as a public good for which there is a market, albeit highly an 
imperfect one.  
Assuming that aid determinants rest on a demand and a supply function of aid, he shows 
theoretically that the adjustment of the supply function to the demand function of aid leads to 
an equation where aid flows depend on the unemployment, the Government Budget deficit, 
the aid disbursement of all OECD countries other than country i, the level of per capita 
income in country i in relation to per capita of other OECD countries and an Indicator of Aid 
quality. This equation is estimated for each country separately as well as on pooled 
regression. The sample covers 9 OECD countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USA and U.K) over the period 1961-1979. Using OLS 
technique country by country, he concludes among other variables for a positive and 
significant effect of the central government budget deficit on aid flows for Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, whereas the effect is mixed (either positive or negative) but not statistically 
significant for the other countries.  
Faini (2006) also explores through a theoretical model the links between fiscal policy 
in donors’countries and their aid effort. He develops a simple model and obtained that the 
OECD Donors’ aid effort depends on the budgetary conditions (the primary surplus and the 
stock of public debt), on the political orientation of the government, the output gap, and the 
one-year lagged value of the aid effort. This model is estimated with the dependent variable 
proxied alternatively by the net official ODA; the total official flows and the Roodman’s Net 
Aid transfers measure. The sample covers 15 donor countries over the period 1980-2004. The 
use of fixed-effects method leads him to conclude that an increase in the budget deficit or in 
the stock of debt leads to a severe decline of the development assistance.  
The last theoretical model is that of Sam (2011) who examines the aid expenditures 
response to banking crises in donor countries. He develops and estimates a model of long-run 
and short-run determinants of aid supply. Using the two-step of Engle and Granger’s method 
with fixed effects, he observed that bilateral aid supplies2 are positively driven in the long-run 
by government saving and government expenditures (both in percent of GDP). Moreover, 
government spending (as a percentage of GDP) drive positively aid disbursements on the 
short-run.  
                                                          
2
 Total bilateral aid is here the net bilateral aid disbursement minus debt relief which excludes 
disbursements to multilateral organizations but includes support to NGOs and international 
private organizations) over the period 1960-2009. 
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2.2 The review of the empirical literature on the determinants of aid 
generosity 
Besides the theoretical models described above, several other empirical studies have 
been conducted on this topic. 
Round and Odedokun (2004) investigating the decline in aid flows over the period 
1970-2000 on a sample of all 22 DAC countries, have looked at the determinants of gross 
disbursements of ODA loans and grants, as a proxy of aid generosity. By controlling for other 
political and non-political factors (per capita income, peer pressure, the number of checks and 
balances, polarization and fractionalization within the government, a time trend and the 
political orientation) they do not find a significant effect of fiscal balance on aid effort. 
Bertoli et al. (2008) have concentrated their study on the determinants of aid effort 
(proxied by the net aid disbursements, net of debt relief, as share of GDP) for all of the 22 
OECD DAC countries over the period 1973-2002, with a particular focus on the Italian case 
for a comparison purpose. In employing fixed effects estimation technique and controlling for 
other political and non-political factors, they observe that the fiscal deficit exerts a positive 
effect on aid generosity.  
Mendoza et al. (2009) investigate in the wake of the global financial crisis whether 
economic and financial conditions are negatively linked to official development assistance 
(both bilateral ODA and total ODA) provided by the USA. Focusing on the period 1967-
2007, they show evidence that among other regressors, tax revenues do not affect significantly 
both bilateral and total US ODA.  
Dang et al. (2010) investigate the effects of banking crisis on a sample of 24 donor 
countries over the period 1977-2007. They use two indicators of aid: Net Aid disbursements 
and Net Aid Transfers and find evidence that banking crisis exert severe negative effects on 
aid supplies, with these effects diminishing over time. The lagged budget surplus/deficit (in % 
of GDP) in the donor’s countries adversely influences aid flows, suggesting that the budget 
surplus is achieved by cutting aid along with many other spending categories.  
Mold et al. (2010) also explore empirically the determinants of net bilateral ODA on a 
panel of all 22 DAC countries over the period 1960-2007. By employing the System-GMM 
estimator (Blundell and Blond, 1998) and fixed effects, they conclude that the scope for aid 
allocations are larger when fiscal circumstances allow it, and that geopolitical and political 
purposes are important in aid disbursements.  
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Chong and Gradstein (2002) examine the determinants of foreign aid with respect to 
the donors. Applying both fixed-effects panel data and Arellano-Bond dynamic estimator 
techniques, they conclude on a sample of 22 DAC countries over the period 1973-2002 that as 
tax revenues increase, aid effort rise. 
Other studies have focused more on the political determinants of aid supplies.  
Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) use a dynamic econometric methodology (both fixed 
effects and GMM procedure) on a panel of 17 donor’s countries over the period 1970-1997 to 
test whether the sizeable reduction in aggregate level of aid flows in the 1990’s was due to the 
end of the Cold war. As a control variable, fiscal balance appears to not exert a significant 
effect on aid supplied by donors. Dustin Tingley (2010) has broken out foreign aid by 
different categories (e.g., low-income versus high-income developing countries) and channels 
(bilateral versus multilateral) to examine how domestic political and economic environment 
influence the support for foreign aid.  Using two main political variables (a measure of the 
government ideological orientation and changes in welfare state institutions proxied by the 
time-varying “generosity” indicator calculated by Scruggs (2006)), he concludes that as 
governments become more conservative, their aid effort is likely to fall. Moreover, changes in 
welfare state institutions exert positive effects on total and multilateral aid as well as aid to 
LDC/OLIC (Least Developed Countries/Other Low-Income Countries), but no significant 
effect on LMIC/OMIC (Low-Middle Income Countries/Other Middle Income Countries). 
Overall, we can infer from this empirical literature that “the fiscal determinants of aid 
supply contradict one another sufficiently so that there is no trenchant evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal policy and aid flows”.   
Our purpose in the following sections is to understand how fiscal variables, especially 
fiscal episodes, namely fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli episodes as well as their size in 
donor countries affect the aid expenditures toward developing countries. The next section will 
consider how these episodes fiscal in OECD countries are determined. 
3. The determination of Fiscal episodes in OECD Countries 
The choice of the approach to measure the fiscal episodes is a critical point when 
assessing their effects on Aid supplies.  
The empirical literature provides several definitions for timing fiscal contractions and 
stimuli (expansion) with most of them relying on the structural budget balance concept, the 
balance that results from intentional actions of policymakers.  
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Fiscal episodes (consolidations and stimuli) result from the attempts of the 
governments to change the budgetary position of the government: fiscal consolidations or 
stabilizations aim at adopting discretionary fiscal policies which cut budget deficits whilst 
fiscal stimuli consist of discretionary fiscal policy that increase budget deficits. To identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes, we need to compute a measure of fiscal impulse. The Fiscal 
Impulse is the discretionary change in budgetary position and can be measured as the 
difference between the actual budgetary position and what would prevail under a benchmark 
cyclical situation (Alesina and Perotti, 1995a).  
As mentioned by Alesina and Perotti (1995a), the use of the discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy indicator means eliminating from the budget balance two components: the 
interest payments, which cannot be directly influenced by government’s policies and the 
cyclical component of the budget. 
The first adjustment implies the use of the primary surplus (or deficit), whilst the second 
correction is more problematic. This is why there exists several ways on the empirical 
literature to deal with this issue: 
- one possibility is to ignore the existence of the cyclical component in the primary 
budget balance and consider the change in primary deficit as the measure of fiscal impulse.  
-the second option is to use the cyclically adjusted budget deficits provided by the 
OECD or the IMF that rely upon somewhat arbitrary measures of “potential output” and base 
years.  
- the last option is the one suggested by Blanchard (1993). This approach is more 
attractive to the extent that it does not require a measure of potential output for computing the 
primary surplus (deficit) corrected for cyclical components. This measure consists of 
calculating how the budget balance would be in a certain year, if unemployment had not 
changed from the previous year: this cyclical adjustment is an attempt to eliminate from the 
budget balance, changes in taxes and transfers induced by changes in unemployment, when 
tax-transfers laws remained unchanged.  
Once calculating the fiscal impulse measure, we need a rule to identify the fiscal 
episodes (fiscal consolidations and fiscal stimuli periods). The criteria used in the existing 
literature to identify these episodes differ slightly from paper to paper. In this paper, we apply 
the original Alesina and Perotti (1995)’s definitions, re-employ recently in Ardagna and 
Alesina (2010) and also widely used in practice. According to those definitions,  
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- “A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
-  “A period of fiscal stimulus is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance deteriorates by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
Accordingly, we use the episodes of fiscal adjustments and stimuli identified by 
Ardagna and Alesina (2010) to examine their effects on aid efforts: the authors focus upon a 
sample of 21 OECD countries with data spanning over 1970-2007. The countries included in 
their sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. However, in our database, we exclude 
“Greece and Switzerland” because these countries have significantly short panels, though our 
results do not change if we include them. 
 Relying on large changes in fiscal policy stance, especially on the reductions and 
increases of budget deficits, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) use the Blanchard (1993)’s indicator 
of fiscal impulse (changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) to identify the fiscal 
episodes. Overall, they identify 107 periods of fiscal adjustments, 65 last only for one period, 
while the rest are multiperiods adjustments and 91 periods of fiscal stimuli with 52 lasting on 
year, the remaining are multiperiods. The table 2a and table 2b list respectively the episodes 
(years) of fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010).     
To have a first look at the response of the Aid flows to the episodes (“before”, 
“during” and “after”) of fiscal consolidations and stimuli, we regress the “Aid variables” on 
dummy indicators for periods “before”, “during” and “after”.  Thus, we estimate the 
following equations: 
, 1 2 1 2 1 2 ,i t i i tAid Beforefa Beforefs EpFA EpFS Afterfa Afterfsα β β λ λ γ γ ε= + + + + + + +    
where the “Aid variable” is alternatively the Net Aid disbursements in percent of GDP 
(ODA), the Net Aid disbursements in percent of GDP from which debt forgiveness in percent 
of GDP is excluded (ODARelief) and the Net Aid Transfers (Roodman 2009) in percent of 
GDP (NAT) (these “Aid” variables are described further in the section IV); i denotes the 
country’s index: i = 1,..,19 and t denotes the time period index: t= 1970,...,2007. 1β , 2β , 1λ , 2λ ,
1γ , and 2γ  are parameters to be estimated and iα  are specific-country effects. 
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“Beforefa “ and “Beforefs” are dummy variables taking the value of “1” the year before the 
fiscal episode starts in a donor country and “0” otherwise, for respectively episodes of fiscal 
adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli (expansion). 
“Afterfa” and “Afterfs” are dummy variables that take the value of “1” the year after the last 
year of the fiscal episode in a donor country (i.e. for example, if a fiscal episode lasts 4 years, 
we associate the value “1” to the fifth year), and “0” otherwise for respectively episodes of 
fiscal adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli (expansion). 
“EpFA” and “EpFS” are the variables indicating respectively the episodes of fiscal 
consolidations and fiscal stimuli.  
We use as estimation technique the panel fixed effects method3. The results (in table 3 
of the Appendix) of the estimations indicate that one year after the fiscal consolidation, aid 
declines significantly, irrespective of the “Aid variable” used. For the other variables of the 
model, we do not find a significant effect; this may be because we have not controlled for 
other explanatory variables. However, it does not matter at this stage of the study, as the 
purpose here is to have a first idea of the effects of fiscal episodes on aid disbursements. The 
next section is devoted to the specification of the model.  
 
4. Econometric Specification 
   
        4.1 The Model 
We follow a general approach that consists of estimating some version of the following 
equation:  
, ,i t i it i it i t i tA X Zα β µ η ε= + + + +    (1) 
where i denotes the countries (i = 1,....., 19) and t denotes years (t = 1970, ......, 2007) and :  
  the dependent variable
, ,
( / )i t i tA Aid GDP= denotes the total Aid flows (bilateral and 
multilateral) from the country i in year t. We use as our primarily dependent variable the net 
ODA disbursements of aid flows of each donor and for robustness check, both the Net ODA 
disbursements of aid flows net of debt forgiveness, in percent of GDP (ODARelief), and the 
Net Aid Transfers (NAT)’s measure of Roodman (2009), also as a percentage of GDP.  
                                                          
3Fixed effects model (FE) appears as the logical econometric specification for having a first 
look on the effect of fiscal consolidation variables on aid disbursements. The reasons are very 
simple: first, Fixed effects allow us to capture unmeasured state-invariant factors influencing 
aid in percent of GDP. Second, the countries in our sample constitute, in principle, the whole 
population of the donor countries, so it is appropriate to treat the individual effects as fixed 
rather than random. 
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The vector 
,i tX represents the Fiscal Episodes variables and include: the episodes of fiscal 
consolidation, the size of the fiscal consolidation, the episodes of fiscal stimuli and the size of 
fiscal stimuli. These variables are included in all our regressions.  
 The vector 
,i tZ  comprises two kind of time-varying control variables derived from the 
empirical literature:  
     - On one side, a set of time-varying control variables that are include in all regressions: the 
fiscal balance (in percent of GDP), the gross public debt as a percentage of GDP and the 
Output gap. These variables combined to the fiscal episodes variables form our baseline 
regression model.  
      - On the other side, a set of time-varying and non-varying control variables derived from 
the empirical literature are included once in the baseline model: the degree of trade openness; 
a variable capturing the ideological orientation of the government; the number of years since 
the fiscal consolidation has started in a donor country as well as its square; the number of 
years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country as well as its square; the quality of 
bureaucracy; the quality of governance; the level of population; the real effective exchange 
rate; banking crises; the unemployment rate; the inflation rate; the cold war and the welfare 
state institutions. 
iµ  are donor fixed-effects that are incorporated in the model to capture the 
heterogeneity among countries as well as the likely importance of unobservable correlated 
with the error term in determining aid flows. The use of fixed effects iµ  in our regressions is 
dictated by several reasons: First, since our sample is composed of heterogeneous countries, 
there are likely state-invariant and unmeasured factors correlated with the error term in 
determining aid flows. 
Second, the number of time periods is significantly higher than the dimension of our panel. 
Moreover, our macro panel contains, in principle, most countries of interest (representing the 
whole population of the OECD donor countries), and thus, will not likely be a random sample 
from a much larger universe of countries.  
tη  are year dummies and are included in all specifications to account for common 
shocks to aid volume in any given year.  
The disturbance 
,i tε  is assumed to be i.i.d. (0, 2εσ ), that is, assumed not correlated with 
the explanatory variables of the model and, the normality of which is not required (Baltagi, 
2002). 
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Should our supply equation of aid flows have a dynamic specification? 
Wildavsky (1964) points out that current year’s spending in any public agency is 
predominantly influenced by the budget of the previous year. Mosley (1984) reinforces this 
argument by stressing that it is particular true for aid agencies, since aid projects often run 
over several years, with financial flows being committed already in year one. 
To explore statistically this likely dynamic specification, we follow the procedure 
suggested by Maddala (1987) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This procedure described in 
the appendix, refers to a Wald test to study if the lagged dependent variables has a direct 
effect on the dependent variable, apart from the indirect influence generated by serial 
correlations of the errors. If this is the case, then the model is called “state-dependence” or 
“system dynamic” and if not, it is called “serial correlation” or “error dynamics”.  
To perform the test, we use two lags of the dependent variable because additional lags 
appear not significant. The results are presented in Table 8 and are further interpreted in the 
section V. Accordingly, we estimate the previous described model specification with two 
lagged dependent variables. While it is well-known that the fixed-effects estimator generate 
biased results in a dynamic panel, Nickell (1981) proves that this bias decreases in the number 
of time periods and approaches zero as T (the time period) approaches infinity (the time 
dimension of the panel is large). Accordingly, as our time-dimension is T=38 and our cross-
section dimension is N= 19, we choose to work with the fixed effects. 
In the next section, we discuss the expected sign of the different regressors included in the 
model. 
   4.2 Discussion on the Expected signs of the variables 
Episodes of fiscal consolidations: During the episodes of large fiscal consolidation, 
governments tighten their budgets and reduce the high debt levels to make public finances 
sustainable. Therefore, we can expect governments to reduce several items of expenditure 
including spending on aid flows, despite their firm commitment to increase aid exports to 
recipient’s countries. However, as have mentioned Round and Odedokun (2004) - P306, since 
“aid can act as an immense foreign policy tool for donor governments, it is not a particular 
discretionary item in the budget”; thus, it may not be reduced even in deterioration of public 
finance situations. Although this argumentation runs contrary to the expectation of a 
procyclical pattern of foreign aid (Hallet, 2009), we can also expect aid expenditures to be 
protected during the episodes of fiscal consolidation. In other words, large Fiscal 
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consolidation can exert a positive effect on aid flows. In addition, we also assume the 
governments in face of several competing government expenditures to reduce several items, 
but maintain or increase aid exports for strategic or geopolitical reasons: aid could be 
protected even when spending is being constrained (Round and Odedokun 2004). 
 
The Size of fiscal consolidation: the greater the size of tightening fiscal policy, the 
higher the effect on aid supply. However, in reference to the hypotheses mentioned above, the 
size of fiscal consolidation may be ambiguous as the effect may be positive or negative on aid 
supplies, depending on policymakers’ preferences. 
 
Episodes of fiscal stimuli: During large episodes of fiscal stimuli that aim to 
stimulate the domestic activity, aid expenditures may decrease (this is considered as a 
discretionary component that is cut in favour of social and investment spending), increase as 
the other discretionary components of expenditures, or it may neither increase nor decrease.    
 
Size of the fiscal stimuli: We expect a priori that a high level of the fiscal stimuli size 
will lead to a rise of aid expenditures. However, for the reasons mentioned above, the effect 
may be neutral or, aid supplies may even decrease. 
 
The Budget deficit and the public debt: As in Mosley (1985), Round and Odedokun 
(2004), Faini (2006) and Bertoli et al. (2008), we hypothesize that the cases of weaker fiscal 
position characterized by larger budget deficits and high levels of public debt, will ceteris 
paribus lead to the reduction in the level of discretionary spending, especially that of aid flows 
– because of strong pressures to reduce deficits and public debt and preserve scarce foreign 
currency. In other words, a healthy fiscal position will be associated ceteris paribus with 
higher spending, including on Official Development Assistance. We also follow Bertoli et al. 
(2008) and hypothesize that “given the small volume of aid relative to GDP, it is the overall 
level of public expenditures rather than its allocation among different expenditures chapters 
that influences the volume of aid” (see also Faini, 2006).  
In contrast to these hypothesis and in accord with Bertoli et al. (2008), we can also 
assume that weak budgetary positions – or significant debt overhang may not have a 
detrimental impact on foreign aid, provided that the governments adopts an accommodating 
attitude towards the fiscal disequilibria over the medium term. 
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Output Gap: The effect of the output gap (the difference between the maximum 
output achievable and the actual level of output) can be either positive or negative as a 
positive output shock may not necessarily lead to higher aid expenditures. 
 
The Number of fiscal consolidation episodes: We introduce a counter variable (in 
replacement of the variable “Epfa”) (see also Dang et al. 2010 for the same procedure with 
regard to the “banking crisis variable”) in our model to capture the effects of fiscal 
consolidation: the “number of years of fiscal consolidation”. This variable records the number 
of years since the first year where a fiscal consolidation occurs, with the first year taking a 
value of “1” and the value “0” for all years subsequent to the fiscal consolidation end’s year. 
To allow the effect to diminish over time, we include this counter variable in both linear and 
square terms in the model. In other words, we expect a negative effect of the counter variable 
“number of years of fiscal consolidation” but a positive effect of its square terms.  
 
The Number of fiscal stimuli episodes: the construction of this variable follows the 
same procedure as for the variable “number of years of fiscal consolidation” with the 
difference here being that this variable records the number of years since the first year of the 
occurrence of a fiscal stimulus. This variable takes the value of “1” for the first year, “2” for 
the second year,..etc, and the value “0” for all years subsequent to the fiscal stimuli end’s 
year. To allow the effect to diminish over time, we also include this counter variable in both 
linear and square terms in the model. In other words, we expect a positive, neutral or even a 
negative effect of this counter variable.  
 
   Openness degree: We follow the empirical literature on aid determinants (Boschini 
and Olofsgard 2007; Dang et al. 2009; Dustin Tingley, 2010 and Sam, 2011) and assume that 
donor countries relying more on trade may see foreign aid as a useful tool to promote trade 
and hence increase their aid effort. Thus, the measure of how exposed a country is to trade 
Openness is: (Exports + Imports)/GDP. 
 
Ideological Orientation of the government: The empirical literature on aid supplies 
has posited that ceteris paribus, right-wing regimes in donor countries exhibit lower aid 
supplies compared to left-wing governments. However, the influence of government’s 
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ideological orientation (social-democrat versus libertarian-conservative) on aid supplies 
remains not clear-cut on the basis of aggregate aid data. Indeed, conservative governments 
may allocate more aid to promote national commercial interests, while progressive 
governments provide a similar amount for altruistic reasons (Round and Odedokun 2004; 
Bertoli et al. 2008). 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate: It is expected that a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate will improve the balance of payments and thus increase overseas development assistance.  
 
Unemployment: Beenstock (1980) and Mosley (1985) mention that unemployment is 
one of the most important explanatory variables apart from fiscal balance when explaining aid 
expenditures, as there may be obvious incentives to cut aid expenditures and redirect funds 
towards domestic expenditures in times of fiscal problems. Thus, we expect unemployment to 
reduce the level of aid supplied by the donors. 
 
The quality of bureaucracy: This variable captures revisions of policy when 
governments change. As a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-today administrative functions, a strong quality of bureaucracy should 
minimize the revision of policy when governments change. Therefore, we can expect a 
stronger quality of bureaucracy to be associated with a higher level of aid disbursements by 
donors.  
 
The quality of governance: It is another way of measuring the role of political factors 
on aid supplies. The quality of governance is a composite index of corruption in government, 
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. We expect a better quality of governance in a 
donor’s country to be associated with higher aid supplies. 
 
Banking crises: As we have observed above, a banking crisis in a donor country is 
expected to lead to a reduction of aid flows irrespective of its effect on the other economic 
variables such as real GDP or government budget. Indeed according to Dang et al. (2010) 
Bank rescues and recapitalizations place massive new fiscal demands on the public sector; 
even if the government is eventually able to recoup many of the costs of these rescues through 
asset sales, the short-term effect is to worsen sharply the government’s cash flow.  
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Inflation: Greater economic difficulties (for instance, a high level of inflation with its 
inducing macroeconomic instability effects) will lead to lower support for foreign aid 
programs. Thus, we expect a negative effect of this variable on aid supplies. 
 
Real GDP per Capita: Aid over GDP is assumed to be a “superior good”, that is, the 
ratio of aid over GDP is expected to increase as the per capita income raises. 
 
Population: According to Round and Odedokun (2004), an increase in population size 
is likely to be associated with greater population heterogeneity, loss of social cohesion and 
ceteris paribus, declining willingness to redistribute. There is a support to this hypothesis to 
the extent that within the DAC, the small countries – such as the Nordics – are more 
homogeneous and cohesive and have for long maintained an altruist and progressive attitude 
towards foreign aid.    
 
 Cold: This variable captures certain main miscellaneous qualitative time-related 
factors that affect aid supplies. Indeed, the empirical literature highlights that aid has 
plummeted from the early 1990s due among others to the end of the cold war. Indeed, the 
emergence of Eastern European countries from the early 1990s creates a competition with the 
conventional developing countries for aid and provides a greater freedom to donors for 
reducing aid on the basis of concerns about governance issues, fact to which they had to turn a 
blind during a cold war era (see Round and Odedokun 2004; Hjertholm and White 2000).    
 
 Welfare institutions: Therien and Noel (2000) argue that the influence of partisanship 
is indirect and operates through other policies like social-democratic welfare state institutions 
and social spending. Hence, the influence of political parties is only cumulative and operates 
indirectly through welfare institutions: the strong welfare institutions best explain foreign aid 
spending patterns. However, whereas Therien and Noel (2000) argue that welfare state 
institutions are relatively fixed, this argument has recently been disputed by scholars who find 
that the earlier measures are deceptively static (Allan and Scruggs, 2004). We follow Dustin 
Tingley (2010) and use the “generosity” measure of Scruggs (2006) which is a time-varying 
measure of state welfare institutions (changes in state welfare institutions).  
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5. The Data and the econometric methodology 
5.1 The Data 
We define and describe here the “Aid variable” as well as the “fiscal episodes 
variables” used in our model. The other explanatory variables are described in the table 4. The 
model is estimated on a sample of 19 countries, with data covering the period 1970-2007. 
Indeed, as previously mentioned, we consider the entire sample of Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010) but exclude “Greece and Switzerland” (see above for explanation).  
    5.1.1 The Dependent Variable: Aid data 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of aid flows, several indicators of aid 
effort have been used: whereas some authors have used “aid as a percentage of GDP” (for 
instance, Bertoli et al. 2008; Faini, 2006), few studies have relied on using as dependent 
variable the overall aid (for instance Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007, Dang et al. 2009) and 
others have resorted to the use of (log of) aid per capita (see for instance, Frot, 2009). 
For our main test, the dependent variable is net Aid flows data (as a percentage of 
GDP) which allows us to control for loans repayments. More particularly, we use the Net 
disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA)’s share of GDP. The latter 
comprises grants and loans with at least a grant’s element of 25%.  
We then check for the robustness of our main results by considering additional 
variables of Aid effort: the Net Aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (ODARelief) and 
the Net Aid Transfers (NAT), described by Roodman, (2009)4, both as a percentage of GDP. 
The Net Aid Transfers concept subtracts out repayments of principal as well as interest 
payments and cancellation of non-ODA loans (aka debt relief). This variable more closely 
approximates the current budgetary outlays associated with ODA.  
5.1.2 The Fiscal Episodes Variables 
Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation (and Stimuli): We use the variables constructed by 
Ardagna and Alesina (2010) according to their definition of “episodes of fiscal adjustments 
and fiscal stimuli” (see above). These authors have focused on large changes of fiscal policy 
to identify the episodes of fiscal adjustments and stimuli of OECD Countries.  
                                                          
4
 See Centre for Global Development and data described in Roodman (2006 and 2009). 
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The previous definition selects 100 episodes of fiscal consolidation (13.8% of the 
observations in our sample) and 85 episodes of fiscal stimuli (11.8% of the observations in 
our sample) for 19 countries over the period 1970-2007.  
The Size of Fiscal consolidation (and Stimuli): We follow the empirical literature on 
fiscal episodes (that is, consolidation and stimulus) (see for example, Guichard, S. et al. 2007) 
and consider the size of fiscal consolidation (and Stimuli) as the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance expressed in percent of GDP over the whole episode (last year of the 
episode minus the year before it starts). It is worth mentioning that the measure of the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance used here is the one computed by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010).  
 
The Number of years since the fiscal consolidation (stimuli) has started in a donor 
country: these two variables are constructed following Dang at al. (2009)’s methodology 
related to banking crisis (see above for the description of these variables). 
5.2 The econometric methodology 
In this part, we discuss the econometric technique suitable for estimating the effects of 
fiscal episodes on aid supplies. Consider the model (1) described above. We first impose the 
restrictions that  iα α=  and iβ  = β , for i = 1,..., 19.   
Our baseline model specification is:  
, 1 2 3 4 1 2
3 ,
i t it it it it it
it i t i t
A epfa Sizetight epfs Sizeloose Govnetlend Pubdebt
Outputgap
α α α α β β
β µ η ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +
 (2) 
where 
,i tA denotes ODA, ODARelief or NAT variables as previously defined; EpFA = 
Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation (Adjustment); Sizetight = Size of fiscal consolidation; 
EpFS = Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli (Expansion); Sizeloose = Size of fiscal expansion or 
stimuli; Govnetlend = General government fiscal balances (Total Revenues minus Total 
Expenditures) in percent of GDP; Pubdebt = Gross Public Debt-to-GDP-ratio; Outputgap = 
the outputgap; iµ  and tη  are respectively country-specific  effects and temporal dummies as 
previously defined. 
The use of fixed effects estimator (LSDV estimator) raises several issues.  
-First, as the time dimension of our panel is large, there is likely serial correlation of errors 
(serial correlation for each individual through the time period), contemporaneous correlation 
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between individuals and heteroscedasticity in the model. These problems are addressed by the 
use of appropriate correction techniques as described below.  
-Second, as we have mentioned above, even if the fixed effects method is often recommended 
in dynamic panels of our size (because the lagged dependent variables bias become less 
serious when T grows larger), there may still be a concern with regard to the inconsistency 
due to the presence of fixed effects in a dynamic panel. The econometric literature has 
proposed instrumental variable (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators 
as an alternative to LSDV technique. However, the properties of these estimators hold only 
when the cross-section dimension (N) is sufficiently high (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Kiviet, 1995; and Judson and Owen, 1999), because these estimators may be severely biased 
and imprecise when N is low (this is the case in our study). However, we present the results 
obtained by the use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) on the baseline regression. This method is supposed to generate 
consistent results (for N higher than T) in the presence of fixed effects and consists of using 
the values on the dependent variable and the independent variables lagged twice and more as 
instruments.  
Kiviet (1995, 1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003) have shown by the use of Monte Carlo 
simulations that the estimation of dynamic models with panel data is possible on small 
samples. Indeed, they show evidence that the LSDVC (Least Square Dummy Variables 
Corrected) estimator is more efficient than the GMM on small samples (N is low). Bruno 
(2005b) has extended previous Monte Carlo findings to the case of unbalanced panel data. 
Based on a strictly exogenous rule, he uses Monte Carlo simulations and both the bias and 
root mean squares error (RMSE) criterion to compare three LSDVC estimators (AH 
(Anderson and Hsiao, 1982), AB (Arellano and Bond, 1991) or BB (Blundell and 
Bond,1998)) to the uncorrected LSDV estimator. 
He concludes that the LSDVC estimator outperforms the others for samples with a 
comparatively small cross-section.  
As the time dimension of our panel is high (T= 38), and the size of our cross-section is 
small (N = 19), we choose to perform all our regressions using the LSDV estimator. We also 
check the robustness of our results by the use of the LSDVC5 estimator (only on the baseline 
regression), and the GMM estimator. 
                                                          
5
 The LSDVC estimator adapted for Unbalanced panels (which is our case) is implemented in 
Stata by Bruno (2004; 2005) and relies on the strong hypothesis that all regressors should be 
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Overall, we adopt the following procedure: 
-Firstly, we estimate our baseline model parameters using the LSDV estimator and 
correct the standard errors6 using by the PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) in order to 
take into account both the contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity of the errors. If 
according to Maddala (1987)’s test, it is observed that the model is “state-dependent” with the 
two lagged dependent variables (as we include two lagged dependent variables in our model) 
or with only one of the lagged dependent variable, then we apply the LSDV along with the 
PCSEs technique (the presence of the lagged dependent variable corrects also for serial 
correlation in the model due to the high time dimension of our panel by including lagged error 
terms into the specification). If by contrast, the model is “serial correlated” with the two year 
lagged values of the dependent variable according to Maddala (1987)’s test, then we remove 
the lagged dependent variables from the model, correct the serial correlation using the Prais-
Winsten estimator (using the rhotype correction proposed by Stata) and perform the 
regression using only the LSDV along with the PCSEs (for contemporaneous correlation of 
error’s correction). 
-Secondly, we will check whether the use of the LSDVC or GMM estimator leads to a 
significant change in our parameters of interest (that of “episode of fiscal consolidation and 
stimuli variables”). This check is performed only on the baseline regression depending on the 
Maddala (1987)’s test results7. If there is no significant change in the parameters, we include 
additional control variables (mentioned above) and use the LSDV estimator along with the 
PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) and/or the Prais-Winsten correction to test for the 
robustness of our coefficients of interest.  
-Thirdly, recognize that the previous assumption of our model parameters’ 
homogeneity ( iα α=  and iβ  = β  and, for i = 1,..., 19) is strong, we relax it by examining the 
variation across different groups of countries, and test to what extent the average effect varies 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
exogenous, not even weakly exogenous. This is why we use the LSDVC as an estimator for 
checking the robustness of our baseline equation results. 
6
 Although the presence of the lagged dependent variables can deal with the serial correlation 
of errors, it doesn’t take into account the contemporaneous correlation of errors. 
7
 If the test reveals the presence of a “state-dependence” in the dynamic specification, then, 
we apply the LSDVC and the GMM estimators. If the dynamic specification is “error 
dynamics”, then we do not use the LSDVC and GMM estimators, but rather the he LSDV 
estimator along with the PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) and the Prais-Winsten 
estimator.  
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according to the group of countries observed. Indeed, the average (common-mean) effects α  
obtained for the fiscal episodes variables (“epfa”, “epfs”, “Sizetight” and “sizeloose”) as well 
as for the parameters β  in equation (2) may hide variations among donor countries. The 
supplies of aid budget reflect motives that go beyond the fiscal situations of the country and 
that can make the donors not reduce their aid expenditure during fiscal consolidation 
episodes. This may explain, as we have shown in the literature review, why there is no 
empirical consensus on the effects of fiscal variables on aid supplies by OECD DAC 
countries. Moreover, the aid allocation literature provides evidence of substantial variation 
among donor countries in their motives for allocating a fixed aid budget across recipient 
countries (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; McGillivray 1989).  
This concern about the poolability of data doesn’t rely only on a theoretical basis, but 
is also rooted on statistical considerations. Pesaran and Smith (1995) have in fact shown that 
incorrectly pooling data may lead to inconsistent estimates if the model is dynamic.  
Therefore, we explore empirically the stability of our parameter estimates through two 
ways:  
First, we exclude each country in our sample one by one on the baseline regression in 
order to test whether or not the results depend on the set of included countries. 
Second, we choose to split our sample into 3 major groups (although recognizing that 
any splitting of our sample into sub-samples remains somewhat arbitrary) and estimate the 
baseline model over the whole period 1970-2007. This will allow us to check whether the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are different from those obtained in the baseline 
regression over the full sample. The groups are then:   
-the group of European Countries (EU) composed of 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
 -the Group of 7 countries (G7): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom and United States (see also Round and Odedokun 2004 who also use this group of 
countries); 
 -the Group of “Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden”, sometimes 
referred to as the “like minded donors” (Stokke 1989) - (see also Boschini and Olofsgard, 
2005 - who use this group of countries). 
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6.  Evaluation of the estimation results 
In this section, we turn to the interpretation of the results stemming from performing 
our regressions (tables 6 to 10) by the use of the LSDV along with the Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSEs) and/or the Prais-Winsten estimators, the Arellano and Bond (1991)’s 
GMM procedure as well as the LSDVC initialized the bias correction using the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator (the LSDVC and the GMM estimators are used once on the baseline 
regression).  
Before starting the interpretation of the results, let us say few words about the data 
generating process underlying our different specifications, according to Maddala (1987)’s 
test. 
As we can see from the results presented in the table 5, 
-the model on the full sample of 19 countries and that on the sub-sample of EU 
countries display a “state-dependent” with both one and two year lagged values of either 
ODA, ODARelief or NAT dependent variable.  
-the model on the G7 countries is “serial correlation” with both one and two year 
lagged values of either ODA, ODARelief or NAT dependent variable.  
-the model on the sub-sample of “Like-Minded Donors” countries is “state-dependent” 
only with one-year lagged values of ODA. However, with either the ODARelief or NAT 
dependent variable, it is “error dynamics” with both one and two year lagged values. 
Tables 6 reports alternative estimates of our model (full sample of 19 OECD DAC 
countries over the period 1970-2007) obtained by changing the variables included in the 
vector 
,i tx of regressors and/or by using other measures of aid flows: the Net aid 
disbursements minus the debt forgiveness (ODARelief) and the Net Aid Transfers of 
Roodman (2009). Specifically, this table includes the baseline regressors as well as the 
additional variables to check the sensitivity of our coefficients of interest to the inclusion of 
additional regressors. 
Table 7 presents the results obtained from the fiscal episodes effects on aid supplies8 
when we exclude each country in our sample one by one in order to test whether or not the 
results depend on the set of included countries.  
                                                          
8
 Note that the regression is performed on the baseline regression, but we present only the 
results on our parameters of interest. Moreover, the other variables although not presented in 
the table display overall the same effects as in the table 9. The results of these control 
variables can be obtained upon request. 
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Table 8 to 10 contain respectively results on the sub-samples EU, G7 and the “like-
minded Donor countries” over the period 1970-2007. 
We will not discuss the results of each model specification one by one, but we will 
rather provide an overview of each regressor’s parameter by assessing whether they are robust 
and consistent with the expectations presented above. We will particularly focus on our 
variables of interest (“the episodes of fiscal consolidation”, “the episodes of fiscal expansion”, 
the “size of fiscal consolidation” and the “size of fiscal stimuli”). 
On the full sample, we observe that irrespective of the measure of “aid variable” used, 
aid supplies decline during the episodes of fiscal consolidation: over the period 1970-2007, 
aid generosity decreases by a value that fluctuates on average between 0.0178 percent of GDP 
and 0.0275 percent of GDP during the episodes of fiscal retrenchment compared to the years 
of absence of fiscal adjustments. Over the same period, a one percent increase in the size of 
the fiscal consolidation leads to a decline of aid expenditures by a value that swings between 
0.44% of GDP and 0.578% of GDP: this effect is observed for “ODA” variable, but not for 
“ODARelief” and “NAT” variables. Whereas a positive effect is obtained for large fiscal 
stimuli episodes on “ODARelief” and “NAT” variables, we do not find a significant effect for 
“ODA” variable, though the sign appears to be positive. However, the effect of the size of 
loose fiscal policy usually appears with negative sign, but is significant only for “ODARelief” 
and “NAT” variables when the LSDVC estimator is used. This suggests for these particular 
figures a conflicting effect of the episodes of large loose fiscal policy and the size of these 
policies on aid exports.  
In addition, the use of the counter variables described above leads us to conclude that: 
- a one more year of fiscal consolidation leads to a fall of ODA effort by 0.0297% of 
GDP, a decline in ODARelief effort by 0.0178% of GDP. However, no significant effect on 
“NAT” variable is observed. All these effects appear not to decrease over time. 
- a one more year of fiscal stimuli leads to a rise of ODARelief effort by 0.0232% of 
GDP, an increase of NAT expenditures by 0.0178% of GDP, and not affect significantly the 
“ODA” variable. However, these effects seem to decrease after approximately1.08 years for 
both the “ODARelief” effort and the “NAT” effort. 
The table 6 also suggests that our coefficients of interest (that is the effects of “fiscal 
episodes” on aid flows) remain roughly stable and robust to the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables. The latter exhibit the expected sign in the regressions performed.       
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            In accord with Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) and 
in contrast with Bertoli et al. (2008), Faini (2006) and Mosley (1985), the parameter of the 
fiscal surplus in percent of GDP is not statistically significant in almost all specifications 
except two of them where it exhibits a negative sign. This suggests the absence of a fiscal 
balance effect on the level of foreign aid.  
             The coefficient on public debt exhibits alternating significant and non significant 
negative effects on aid supplies. The output gap appears to also exert alternating positive 
significant and non-significant effect on aid supplies.  
What about now the results of the “Country excluded”? We find evidence for “ODA” 
dependent variable that during years of fiscal consolidation, donor countries reduced 
significantly aid flows compared to years characterized by an absence of fiscal adjustment 
with the magnitudes remaining the same as the ones previously obtained. The same 
conclusion applies to the size of fiscal expansion.  
             The fiscal expansion variables, namely fiscal stimuli episodes and the size of fiscal 
stimuli episodes exhibit different patterns with regard to their effect on aid effort depending 
on the “Aid variable” considered. Indeed, there is no significant effect of these variables on 
“ODA”; for “ODARelief” variable, fiscal stimuli episodes exert a significant (positive) effect 
only when Portugal is excluded from the sample whereas the size of these fiscal stimuli 
appears to be significant (and negative) only when Sweden is excluded from the sample. The 
effect of fiscal stimuli episodes on “NAT” variable is significant (and positive) in four cases 
of country’s exclusion from the sample (Australia, Italy, Japan, Sweden and United Kingdom) 
and insignificant in the other cases. However, the size of fiscal stimuli exerts an insignificant 
effect on “NAT” variable, except the case where Sweden is excluded from the sample (in this 
case, the effect is negative and significant). Overall, we can conclude that, apart from the 
exceptions cases, the results are stable and robust to the exclusion of each country from the 
sample. 
             Let us now turn to the results obtained on the Sub-Samples’ countries. The results of 
the baseline model reported in table 8 for EU countries are broadly in line with those found 
previously on the full sample. An average significant and negative effect is found for the 
episodes of fiscal consolidation on aid expenditures, irrespective of the “aid variable” used, 
whereas fiscal loose episodes exert positive and significant effect on the “ODARelief” and 
“NAT” variables (the “epfs” effect on “ODA” is not significant). However, neither the size of 
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the fiscal consolidation, nor the size of fiscal stimuli affects significantly aid supplied by EU 
countries.  
The number of fiscal consolidation’s years affects negatively and significantly only the 
“ODA” effort of EU countries, but no significant effect is observed for the other “Aid 
variables”. Furthermore, this effect doesn’t decrease over time. Except for the “ODA” 
variable where do not find a significant effect for the number of years of fiscal stimuli in EU 
DAC countries, we find evidence of positive and significant effect on “ODARelief” and 
“NAT” variables, with these effects decreasing over time.     
          What about the G7 donor countries? For this sub-group of countries, it is only the size 
of fiscal consolidation that, among the fiscal episodes variables, affects negatively the aid 
effort for all three aid variables. The magnitude of this effect is slightly higher than in the case 
of full sample or EU countries. This result suggests that despite the wealth and their lead on 
renewal of aid commitments, episodes of fiscal consolidation hit severely aid supplies. 
However, in contrast with EU’s sub-sample, neither the counter variables of fiscal 
consolidation nor those of fiscal loose affect the aid effort of G7 countries. 
          The results obtained for the Sub-Sample of the five “Like-minded Donor countries” 
depart clearly from the previous ones: whereas the “epfa” variable affect significantly only the 
“ODA” variable (negative effect) with a magnitude doubling that of EU’s sub-sample, “epfs” 
variable affects significantly only the “ODARelief” and the “NAT” variables (with positive 
effects). Note that these positive effects also double those of the EU’s countries.   
           With regard to the counter variables, it is observed a significant negative and 
decreasing effect of the number of large tight fiscal policy’s years only on “ODA” variable 
supplied by the five “Like-minded Donor countries”. Once again, the magnitude of these 
effects is also higher than those obtained for EU’s countries. The effect of the number of years 
of fiscal stimuli is also positive and significant, irrespective of the “Aid variable” used, and 
decreases over time. The magnitude here is once again higher than that obtained for the EU’s 
sub-sample.  
            Overall, with regard to our variables of interest, we observe at least an effect of one 
fiscal episodes variables on “Aid variables”, irrespective of the sample used. Even if the 
magnitude of the effects varies with the type of “aid variable” considered, it remains that the 
effects of fiscal consolidation and that of fiscal loose policies are respectively negative and 
positive on aid supplies, with sometimes a decreasing over time. Where the size of fiscal 
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consolidation or that of fiscal stimuli appears to affect significantly the aid effort of DAC 
countries (regardless of the sample considered), the effect is always negative.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of OECD donor countries with respect to their 
aid effort during the fiscal episodes (episodes of fiscal consolidation and episodes of fiscal 
stimuli). The focus here is on a panel of 19 OECD DAC countries over the period 1970-2007. 
We use descriptive statistics provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on fiscal episodes in 
OECD countries and regression models to perform this analysis. 
We find strong empirical evidence that, taking the full sample of 19 countries, 
irrespective of the effects of the stock of public debt, the fiscal balance and the output gap, the 
population as well as other explanatory variables, aid expenditures are severely curtailed 
during episodes of fiscal consolidation by the donors, with this effect not diminishing over 
time. However, whereas the “ODARelief” and “NAT” supplied by the DAC countries 
increase during years of large fiscal stimuli, no significant effect is found for “ODA” variable.  
In addition, the higher the size of fiscal consolidation, the lower the overseas 
development assistance disbursed by OECD donors. When the effect of large loose fiscal 
policy’s size is significant, the parameter appears to be negative. 
In order to check the stability of the parameters of our estimates, we split our sample 
in three groups: the European Union Group, the Group of the 7 richest countries and the 
Group of “like minded countries”: Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  
 For the EU sub-sample countries, we observe the same pattern of the effect of our interest 
variables. By contrast, in G7 countries, it is only the size of fiscal consolidation that matters 
for aid supplies, with a negative effect. In contrast with EU’s sub-sample, we observe that 
neither the counter variables of fiscal consolidation nor those of fiscal loose affect the aid 
effort of G7 countries. 
          The results obtained for the sub-Sample of the five “Like-minded Donor countries” 
depart clearly from the previous ones: whereas the episodes of fiscal retrenchment affect 
significantly only the “ODA” variable (with negative effect) with a magnitude doubling that 
of EU’s sub-sample, the episodes of fiscal stimuli affects significantly only the “ODARelief” 
and the “NAT” variables (with positive effects). We also note that these positive effects 
double those of the EU’s countries.  The counter variables also affect the aid effort of the 
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“Like-minded Donor countries”: we observe a significant negative and decreasing effect of 
the number of large tight fiscal policy’s years only on “ODA” variable. Once again, the 
magnitudes of these effects are also higher than those obtained for EU’s countries. The effect 
of the number of years of fiscal stimuli is also positive and significant, irrespective of the 
“Aid variable” used, and decreases over time. The magnitude here remains higher than that 
obtained for the EU’s sub-sample. Overall, this study provides evidence that during episodes 
of fiscal retrenchment, aid effort decreases severely, whereas it can increase during years of 
large fiscal stimuli. The effect of the latter could be reduced since the size of loose fiscal 
stimuli appears to affect negatively aid supplies.  
Based on these results, we can infer that the fiscal adjustment measures being currently 
adopted by many developed countries will affect their aid expenditures, with these effects 
being likely higher in the “Like-minded Donor countries”. This is proved by the 
announcement in 2010 by the OECD that aid to Africa will be curtailed. These curtailments 
will affect severely the investment spending of developing countries, especially Africans with 
deleterious effects on economic growth and poverty reduction. 
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APPENDIX 1: Tables  
Table 1: Average Aid Supplies during the period 1970-2007 by OECD DAC Countries 
Country Average ODA to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007  
Average ODARelief to 
GNI Ratio over 1970-
2007 
Average NAT to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007 
Australia 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Austria 0.22 0.19 0.19 
Belgium 0.45 0.43 0.43 
Canada 0.37 0.36 0.36 
Denmark 0.75 0.73 0.73 
Finland 0.32 0.31 0.31 
France 0.52 0.47 0.43 
Germany 0.33 0.29 0.31 
Ireland 0.17 0.17 0.19 
Italy 0.19 0.18 0.18 
Japan 0.26 0.22 0.25 
Netherlands 0.79 0.74 0.76 
New Zealand 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Norway 0.78 0.77 0.78 
Portugal 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Spain 0.14 0.13 0.17 
Sweden 0.75 0.73 0.73 
United Kingdom 0.35 0.32 0.33 
United States 0.19 0.17 0.18 
 
Table 2a: The Episodes of fiscal adjustments identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010)  
Australia 1987 1988 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 
Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000 
France 1979 1996 
Germany  1996 2000 
Greece 1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland 1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 
Italy  1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007 
Japan 1984 1999 2001 2006 
Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996 
New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005 
Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006 
Spain 1986 1987 1994 1996 
Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 2004 
United Kingdom 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000 
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Table 2b: The Episodes of fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010)  
 
Australia 1990 1991 
Austria 1975 2004 
Belgium 1975 1981 2005 
Canada 1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland 1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 2003 
France 1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany  1995 2001 
Greece 1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland 1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy  1972 1975 1981 2001 
Japan 1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 1998 2002 2007 
Portugal 1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain 1981 1982 1993 
Sweden 1974 1977 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
United 1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 2001 2002 2003 
United States 2002 
 
Table 3: Fixed effects panel data estimates of the response of aid flows to fiscal episodes 
 Model with “ODA” 
variable 
Model with “ODARelief” 
variable 
Model with “NAT” 
variable 
Estimator Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections 
of standard-errors) 
Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections of 
standard-errors) 
Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections 
of standard-errors) 
Variable    
    
Beforefa -0.00200 -5.53e-05 0.00191 
 
(0.00715) (0.00740) (0.00671) 
EpFA -0.0127 -0.0129 -0.00879 
 
(0.00851) (0.00876) (0.00799) 
Afterefa -0.0156** -0.0154** -0.0123* 
 
(0.00714) (0.00740) (0.00672) 
Beforefs 0.000634 -0.00236 -0.0103 
 
(0.00750) (0.00790) (0.00721) 
EpFS 0.00596 0.00965 0.00543 
 
(0.00895) (0.00924) (0.00837) 
Afterefs 0.0113 0.00240 9.57e-05 
 
(0.00774) (0.00802) (0.00743) 
Constant 0.231*** 0.381*** 0.228*** 
 
(0.0474) (0.0442) (0.0432) 
 
 
  
Countries - Obs 19-653 19-645 19-653 
R-squared 0.683 0.805 0.829 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors of the coefficients; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Description of variables and Sources 
 
ODA = Net Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor, in percent of GDP. 
This variable includes ODA to multilateral institutions. Source: Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
ODARelief = Net Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP. This variable includes ODA to multilateral institutions. 
Source: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
NAT = Net Aid Transfers disbursed by each donor, as a percentage of GDP. This variable 
includes transfers to multilateral institutions. Source: Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
EpFA = Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation (Adjustment). Source: Alesina and Ardagna., 
2010, “Large Changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending”, NBER Working Paper No. 
15438, Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24 – Appendix Table A1. 
 
EpFS = Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli (Expansion). Source: Alesina and Ardagna., 2010, “Large 
Changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending”, NBER Working Paper No. 15438, Tax 
Policy and the Economy, Volume 24 – Appendix Table A1. 
 
Sizetight = Size of fiscal consolidation (adjustment). Source: Calculated by the author using 
the Cyclically adjusted primary balance computed by Ardagna and Alesina (2010) with 
Blanchard’s method. 
Sizeloose = Size of fiscal stimuli (expansion). Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Cyclically adjusted primary balance computed by Ardagna and Alesina (2010) with 
Blanchard’s method. 
Numbertight = the Number of years since the fiscal consolidation has started in a donor 
country, with the first year of the fiscal consolidation taking a value of 1. Source: Calculated 
by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010). 
Numbertightsq = the square of “Numbertight”. Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
Numberloose = the Number of years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country, 
with the first year of the fiscal consolidation taking a value of 1. Source: Calculated by the 
author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
Numberloosesq = the square of “Numberloose”. Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
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Lrgdp = Natural Logarithm of the Real GDP per capita 2005 constant prices in US Dollars. 
Source: Pen World Tables (PWT 6.3), 2009. 
Pubdebt = Gross Public Debt-to-GDP-ratio. Source: The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s New comprehensive database on Public debt – (November 2010). 
Govnetlend = General government fiscal balances (Total Revenues minus Total 
Expenditures) in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 
2010. 
Bureaucracy = Quality of bureaucracy. This variable is used here on a 4-point scale. 
Indeed, the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that 
tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are 
given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. Conversely, countries that 
lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-today administrative 
functions. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
Icrg_qog = Quality of Governance: The quality of governance is measured by subjective 
indices from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-governance index 
from ICRG used here is an 18-point scale, created by summing the following three six-point 
scales: corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law (see the ICRG for 
the criteria used in coding these measures). Regarding corruption and bureaucratic quality, the 
rationale is obvious. The rule-of-law definition indicates that this measure reflects the 
government's administrative capacity in enforcing the law, as well as the potential for rent-
seeking associated with weak legal systems and insecure property rights. Source: 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
REER = Real effective exchange rates based on consumer price indices - Year 2005 = 100; 
An increase denotes a depreciation. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 
2010. 
Unemployment = Unemployment Rate (in % of Total Labor Force). Source: OECD 
Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
Bankingcrises = Banking Crises – It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the 
years of banking crises et 0 otherwise. Source: Data provided by Luc Laeven and Fabian 
Valencia (June 2010) – Website: http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
Inflation = Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %). Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 
88 – December 2010. 
Trade = Openness degree to trade = (Export + Imports)/GDP. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
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Outputgap = Output Gap = the difference between the maximum output achievable and the 
actual level of output. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
Cold = This is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" for years before or equal to 1990 
and "0" after 1990. Source: Author’s Calculation. 
Lpop = Natural logarithm of the level of population. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 
88 – December 2010. 
Elec = Election Year - 1970-2008: The variable “Yearbeforeelec” is a dummy that captures 
one yearbefore the election. The variable Ybelecepfa = Yearbeforeelec * epfa - Source: 
Armingeon et al. (2010) and calculation from the Author - Political Variables  
 See 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/inde
x_ger.html 
 
PoliticalOrientation = Political Orientation variable =  {0} if there is equality in the 
combination of two of these three parties (for example 50% of Right Party and 50% of Left 
Party); {1} if the Right party dominates the government; = {2} if the Centre party dominates 
the government and {3} if the Left party dominates the government. Source: Constructed by 
the Author using the Database of Political Institutions available online from the World Bank 
(Beck et al., 2010). 
Welfareinst = the “generosity” measure of welfare state institutions. Source: Database of 
Scruggs Lyle (2006), http://sp.uconn.edu/scruggs/wp.htm 
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Table 5: Maddala (1987) test for “Aid” variables on the baseline equation 
 Test for 1tODA −  Test for 2tODA −  Test for 1e tODAr lief −  Test for 2e tODAr lief −  Test for 1tNAT −  Test for 2tNAT −  
 On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient 
of 
1tODA −  
On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient of 
2tODA −  
On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the coefficient 
of 
1tODArelief −  
On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the coefficient 
of 
2tODArelief −  
On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient 
of 
1tNAT −  
On the 
restriction of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient 
of 
2tNAT −  
Full 
Sample 
5.34 
(0.0000) 
214.58 
(0.0000) 
2.47 
(0.0168) 
27.48 
(0.0000) 
6.15 
(0.0000) 168.56 (0.0000) 
2.50 
(0.0154) 56.46 (0.0000) 
6.19 
(0.0000) 
181.23 
(0.0000) 
2.25 
(0.0289) 
50.84 
(0.0000) 
EU Sub-
Sample 
4.61 
(0.0001) 
159.82 
(0.0000) 
2.10 
(0.0426) 
20.31 
(0.0000) 
5.45 
(0.0000) 122.30 (0.0000) 
2.31 
(0.0256) 45.06 (0.0000) 
5.52 
(0.0000) 
135.30 
(0.0000) 
1.95 
(0.0612) 
39.34 
(0.0000) 
G7 Sub-
Sample 
0.79 
(0.5982) 
67.52 
(0.0000) 
0.55 
(0.7942) 
11.36 
(0.0009) 
0.83 
(0.5633) 60.90 (0.0000) 
0.50 
(0.8328) 29.54 (0.0000) 
1.33 
(0.2375) 
58.19 
(0.0000) 
0.41 
(0.8965) 
33.92 
(0.0000) 
“Like-
Minded 
Donors” 
1.98 
(0.0616) 
59.55 
(0.0000) 
1.46 
(0.1873) 
8.16 
(0.0049) 
1.12 
(0.3552) 34.05 (0.0000) 
1.13 
(0.3454 22.12 (0.0000) 
1.17 
(0.3228) 
32.15 
(0.0000) 
1.24 
(0.2840) 
 
24.13 
(0.0000) 
 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
        : the table contains Wald Statistics and the P-Value associated.  
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Table 6: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in OECD DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007    
 
 
1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 5a 6a 7a 8a 9a 10a 11a 
 
ODA ODArelief NAT ODA ODArelief NAT ODA ODArelief NAT ODA ODArelief NAT 
Estimator LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDVC9 LSDVC1 LSDVC1 GMM10 GMM11 GMM12 LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
Regressors             
Aidt-1 0.626*** 0.571*** 0.594*** 0.834*** 0.816*** 0.830*** 0.578*** 0.553*** 0.599*** 0.625*** 0.565*** 0.593*** 
 
(0.0476) (0.0481) (0.0468) (0.0288) (0.0334) (0.0293) (0.0896) (0.0854) (0.0858) (0.0478) (0.0481) (0.0468) 
Aidt-2 0.179*** 0.222*** 0.217***    0.219*** 0.250*** 0.212** 0.181*** 0.228*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0457)    (0.0743) (0.0665) (0.0754) (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0456) 
Epfa -0.0268*** -0.0215** -0.0196** -0.0230*** -0.0195** -0.0177** -0.0249*** -0.0202** -0.0178**    
 
(0.00788) (0.00854) (0.00781) (0.00815) (0.00898) (0.00799) (0.00789) (0.00796) (0.00756) 
   
Numbertight          -0.0297*** -0.0178* -0.0160 
 
         (0.00969) (0.0108) (0.00979) 
Numbertightsq          0.00502 -0.000225 4.32e-05 
 
         (0.00397) (0.00442) (0.00404) 
Sizetight -0.498** -0.132 -0.145 -0.453* -0.138 -0.129 -0.440** -0.0931 -0.0959 -0.575** -0.310 -0.278 
 
(0.195) (0.236) (0.225) (0.237) (0.267) (0.231) (0.194) (0.321) (0.304) (0.242) (0.275) (0.264) 
Epfs 0.000325 0.0135 0.0161 0.00629 0.0198** 0.0250* 0.00544 0.0184 0.0222*    
 
(0.00997) (0.0110) (0.0105) (0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0118) 
   
Numberloose          0.00533 0.0232* 0.0272** 
 
         (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0132) 
Numberloosesq          -0.00532 -0.0107* -0.0125** 
 
         (0.00538) (0.00582) (0.00554) 
Sizeloose -0.0586 -0.324 -0.352 -0.160 -0.480* -0.516* -0.107 -0.344 -0.392 0.117 -0.111 -0.104 
 
(0.258) (0.299) (0.294) (0.302) (0.288) (0.295) (0.365) (0.384) (0.387) (0.287) (0.326) (0.324) 
                                                          
9
 The LSDVC regression is performed using Arellano and Bond’s estimator. 
10
 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.21 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.119. 
11
 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.737 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.304. 
12
 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.977 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.539. 
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Govnetlend -0.000663 -0.000880 -0.000840 -0.000363 -0.000419 -0.000607 -0.000358 -0.000136 -0.000481 -0.000583 -0.000773 -0.000747 
 
(0.000901) (0.000939) (0.000875) (0.00132) (0.00136) (0.00130) (0.000916) (0.00109) (0.000935) (0.000894) (0.000934) (0.000868) 
Pubdebt -0.000177 -0.000206* -0.000263** -0.000183 -0.000217 -0.000251* -0.000218* -0.000251** -0.000284** -0.000174 -0.000201* -0.000254** 
 
(0.000112) (0.000116) (0.000111) (0.000154) (0.000182) (0.000151) (0.000105) (0.000107) (0.000105) (0.000112) (0.000115) (0.000110) 
Outputgap 0.00204 0.00281* 0.00222* 0.00193 0.00235 0.00225* 0.00261 0.00290 0.00271 0.00201 0.00289* 0.00232* 
 
(0.00146) (0.00153) (0.00126) (0.00128) (0.00155) (0.00125) (0.00168) (0.00193) (0.00189) (0.00146) (0.00153) (0.00125) 
Constant 0.106*** 0.0869*** 0.0819***       0.103*** 0.0874*** 0.0821*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0191)       (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0190) 
 
            
Countries - Obs 19-606 19-601 19-606 19-616 19-613 19-616 19-587 19-582 19-587 19-606 19-601 19-606 
Overall R2 0.963 0.970 0.974       0.964 0.970 0.974 
Time and or Year 
Dummies 
Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
LSDVC indicates Bruno (2005) bias correction. 
The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 6: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in OECD DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007 (continued) 
 
 
12a 13a 14a 15a 16a 17a 18a 19a 20a 21a 22a 23a 
 
ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA 
Estimator LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
Regressors             
Aidt-1 0.569*** 0.612*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 0.610*** 0.624*** 0.625*** 0.621*** 0.575*** 0.624*** 0.615*** 0.632*** 
 
(0.0604) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0549) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0512) 
Aidt-2 0.126** 0.164*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.174*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.183*** 0.188*** 0.141*** 
 
(0.0598) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0463) (0.0465) (0.0463) (0.0536) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0499) 
Epfa -0.0243*** -0.0262*** -0.0268*** -0.0271*** -0.0254*** -0.0266*** -0.0269*** -0.0269*** -0.0275*** -0.0264*** -0.0217*** -0.0250*** 
 
(0.00823) (0.00783) (0.00788) (0.00787) (0.00779) (0.00789) (0.00790) (0.00789) (0.00803) (0.00791) (0.00840) (0.00798) 
Sizetight -0.473** -0.493** -0.498** -0.506*** -0.488** -0.515*** -0.499** -0.488** -0.578*** -0.491** -0.529*** -0.421** 
 
(0.185) (0.196) (0.195) (0.196) (0.194) (0.195) (0.196) (0.195) (0.192) (0.196) (0.192) (0.198) 
Epfs 0.00502 0.00194 0.000325 9.87e-05 0.000359 0.00137 0.000681 0.000912 0.000917 7.27e-05 9.55e-05 0.00606 
 
(0.0116) (0.00995) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00991) (0.00996) (0.00998) (0.00998) (0.0110) (0.00998) (0.00991) (0.0109) 
Sizeloose -0.0724 -0.0691 -0.0586 -0.0574 -0.0919 -0.0672 -0.0601 -0.0637 -0.113 -0.0580 -0.0354 -0.0929 
 
(0.285) (0.257) (0.258) (0.258) (0.254) (0.257) (0.259) (0.257) (0.279) (0.258) (0.258) (0.273) 
Govnetlend -0.00203* -0.00112 -0.000663 -0.00100 -0.000916 -0.000657 -0.000725 -0.000561 -0.00181* -0.000632 -0.000678 -0.00126 
 
(0.00113) (0.000919) (0.000901) (0.000936) (0.000896) (0.000899) (0.000923) (0.000903) (0.00103) (0.000893) (0.000899) (0.000973) 
Pubdebt -0.000388** -0.000274** -0.000177 -0.000178 -0.000230** -0.000171 -0.000176 -0.000173 -0.000373*** -0.000199* -0.000179 -0.000211 
 
(0.000151) (0.000119) (0.000112) (0.000116) (0.000115) (0.000112) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000143) (0.000115) (0.000113) (0.000129) 
Outputgap 0.00319* 0.00239 0.00204 0.00175 0.00211 0.00210 0.00207 0.00198 0.00111 0.00188 0.00200 0.00114 
 
(0.00183) (0.00147) (0.00146) (0.00147) (0.00145) (0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00145) (0.00184) (0.00148) (0.00146) (0.00142) 
icrg_qog 0.121*            
 
(0.0622)            
Lpop  -0.153***           
 
 (0.0489)           
Cold   0.0319*          
 
  (0.0193)          
Bankingcrises    -0.0182         
 
   (0.0124)         
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Reer     0.000724***        
 
    (0.000194)        
Inflation      -0.00117       
 
     (0.000956)       
Trade       0.000212      
 
      (0.000284)      
Political 
Orientation 
       -0.00228     
 
       (0.00256)     
Unemployment         -0.00255*    
 
        (0.00145)    
Lrgdp          0.00659   
 
         (0.0104)   
Yearbeforeelec           0.00468  
 
          (0.00496)  
Ybelecepfa           -0.0200  
 
          (0.0123)  
Welfareinst            0.00378*** 
 
           (0.00141) 
 
            
Constant -0.0240 2.617*** 0.0498*** 0.104*** 0.0385 0.102*** 0.0760*** 0.0878*** 0.128***  0.0805***  
 
(0.0544) (0.811) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0216)  (0.0188)  
 
            
Countries-Obs 19-445 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-497 19-606 19-606 17-464 
Overall R2 0.967 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.963 0.963 0.966 0.963 0.964 0.972 
Time and or Year 
Dummies 
Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
          The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
         a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
        b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
       c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
      d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 7: Effects of fiscal episodes variables on Aid Supplies if countries are excluded (Using LSDV estimator along with the PCSEs) 
 
Country 
Excluded 
Effect of Fiscal Episodes 
on ODA 
Effect of the Size of the 
Fiscal Episodes  on ODA 
Effect of Fiscal Episodes 
on ODARelief 
Effect of the Size of the 
Fiscal Episodes  on 
ODARelief 
Effect of Fiscal 
Episodes on NAT 
Effect of the Size of the 
Fiscal Episodes on NAT 
 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
Fiscal 
consolidation 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
 
            
Australia -0.0254*** 0.00303 -0.440** -0.0747 -0.0197** 0.0168 -0.0564 -0.351 -0.0176** 0.0196* -0.0687 -0.376 
 
(0.00802) (0.0101) (0.198) (0.259) (0.00869) (0.0112) (0.239) (0.300) (0.00793) (0.0107) (0.228) (0.295) 
Austria -0.0307*** 0.00169 -0.453** -0.0576 -0.0237*** 0.0133 -0.116 -0.301 -0.0209*** 0.0157 -0.117 -0.334 
 
(0.00781) (0.01000) (0.192) (0.259) (0.00864) (0.0111) (0.239) (0.300) (0.00790) (0.0106) (0.227) (0.294) 
Belgium -0.0279*** 0.000453 -0.486** -0.0828 -0.0228*** 0.0126 -0.0925 -0.332 -0.0206*** 0.0159 -0.117 -0.370 
 
(0.00794) (0.0101) (0.197) (0.261) (0.00866) (0.0112) (0.241) (0.301) (0.00789) (0.0107) (0.230) (0.297) 
Canada -0.0264*** 0.00289 -0.456** -0.0764 -0.0200** 0.0137 -0.0527 -0.314 -0.0178** 0.0164 -0.0579 -0.341 
 
(0.00840) (0.0102) (0.210) (0.260) (0.00906) (0.0113) (0.250) (0.301) (0.00827) (0.0108) (0.238) (0.297) 
Denmark -0.0262*** -8.14e-05 -0.573** -0.0383 -0.0278*** 0.0127 -0.570** -0.256 -0.0256*** 0.0151 -0.560** -0.279 
 
(0.00883) (0.0104) (0.254) (0.273) (0.00890) (0.0112) (0.257) (0.306) (0.00824) (0.0107) (0.251) (0.302) 
Finland -0.0259*** -0.00555 -0.446** 0.145 -0.0225*** 0.00473 -0.0952 -0.0563 -0.0201** 0.00815 -0.117 -0.0929 
 
(0.00809) (0.0110) (0.195) (0.299) (0.00872) (0.0123) (0.240) (0.353) (0.00795) (0.0118) (0.229) (0.349) 
France -0.0275*** -0.00455 -0.499** -0.0215 -0.0223** 0.00959 -0.135 -0.292 -0.0208*** 0.0157 -0.152 -0.376 
 
(0.00800) (0.0106) (0.194) (0.267) (0.00872) (0.0120) (0.236) (0.313) (0.00792) (0.0111) (0.224) (0.302) 
Germany -0.0267*** 0.000468 -0.481** -0.0596 -0.0217** 0.0134 -0.115 -0.336 -0.0196** 0.0160 -0.127 -0.359 
 
(0.00794) (0.0100) (0.203) (0.270) (0.00863) (0.0111) (0.245) (0.312) (0.00790) (0.0106) (0.234) (0.308) 
Ireland -0.0269*** 0.000174 -0.547*** -0.0699 -0.0205** 0.0142 -0.141 -0.338 -0.0182** 0.0165 -0.146 -0.354 
 
(0.00821) (0.0101) (0.208) (0.261) (0.00900) (0.0111) (0.256) (0.302) (0.00820) (0.0106) (0.243) (0.298) 
Italy -0.0256*** 0.00215 -0.474** 0.00398 -0.0205** 0.0150 -0.109 -0.250 -0.0187** 0.0175* -0.119 -0.280 
 
(0.00836) (0.0100) (0.199) (0.260) (0.00912) (0.0111) (0.242) (0.300) (0.00828) (0.0106) (0.230) (0.297) 
Japan -0.0279*** 0.00152 -0.489** -0.104 -0.0229*** 0.0170 -0.0961 -0.402 -0.0207*** 0.0204* -0.123 -0.448 
 
(0.00808) (0.0106) (0.198) (0.266) (0.00874) (0.0117) (0.240) (0.308) (0.00797) (0.0111) (0.229) (0.303) 
Netherlands -0.0228*** 0.000895 -0.495** -0.104 -0.0155* 0.0155 -0.0962 -0.349 -0.0137* 0.0170 -0.103 -0.354 
 
(0.00817) (0.0102) (0.200) (0.265) (0.00882) (0.0112) (0.242) (0.306) (0.00789) (0.0107) (0.227) (0.300) 
New 
Zealand 
-0.0276*** 0.000700 -0.514** -0.0575 -0.0220** 0.0143 -0.138 -0.325 -0.0201** 0.0170 -0.154 -0.354 
 
(0.00824) (0.0101) (0.200) (0.259) (0.00893) (0.0111) (0.242) (0.299) (0.00817) (0.0106) (0.231) (0.294) 
Norway -0.0290*** -0.00960 -0.622*** 0.0883 -0.0239*** 0.00523 -0.207 -0.226 -0.0225*** 0.00888 -0.230 -0.260 
 
(0.00799) (0.0102) (0.195) (0.261) (0.00873) (0.0113) (0.240) (0.302) (0.00795) (0.0108) (0.228) (0.298) 
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Portugal -0.0238*** 0.00618 -0.440** -0.0892 -0.0202** 0.0195* -0.0742 -0.356 -0.0191** 0.0167 -0.0897 -0.343 
 
(0.00766) (0.00980) (0.199) (0.259) (0.00830) (0.0108) (0.234) (0.298) (0.00828) (0.0108) (0.228) (0.295) 
Spain -0.0275*** 0.000700 -0.499** -0.0481 -0.0221** 0.0139 -0.121 -0.330 -0.0202** 0.0162 -0.139 -0.338 
 
(0.00816) (0.0102) (0.200) (0.262) (0.00893) (0.0111) (0.243) (0.299) (0.00810) (0.0108) (0.231) (0.302) 
Sweden -0.0243*** 0.00402 -0.569*** -0.356 -0.0181** 0.0156 -0.183 -0.625** -0.0169** 0.0181* -0.197 -0.667** 
 
(0.00797) (0.0102) (0.195) (0.264) (0.00845) (0.0109) (0.235) (0.294) (0.00753) (0.0100) (0.219) (0.281) 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.0300*** 0.000663 -0.526*** -0.0468 -0.0242*** 0.0164 -0.137 -0.380 -0.0223*** 0.0199* -0.142 -0.425 
 
(0.00828) (0.0108) (0.199) (0.283) (0.00897) (0.0121) (0.243) (0.335) (0.00814) (0.0115) (0.230) (0.328) 
United -0.0265*** 0.00150 -0.486** -0.0670 -0.0220** 0.0133 -0.128 -0.314 -0.0203*** 0.0156 -0.142 -0.340 
 
(0.00793) (0.0101) (0.197) (0.260) (0.00859) (0.0111) (0.237) (0.300) (0.00785) (0.0106) (0.226) (0.296) 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
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Table 8: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in European Union DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007    
 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 
 ODA ODARelief NAT ODA ODARelief NAT 
Estimators LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs 
Variables       
Aidt-1 0.625*** 0.567*** 0.596*** 0.624*** 0.560*** 0.594*** 
 
(0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0512) (0.0529) (0.0526) (0.0511) 
Aidt-2 0.166*** 0.221*** 0.214*** 0.168*** 0.227*** 0.217*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0522) (0.0506) (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0503) 
Epfa -0.0252*** -0.0193** -0.0165*    
 
(0.00887) (0.00953) (0.00866) 
   
Sizetight -0.349 0.106 0.0868 -0.456* -0.0903 -0.0887 
 
(0.220) (0.261) (0.249) (0.272) (0.306) (0.292) 
Epfs 0.00935 0.0213* 0.0247**    
 
(0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0118) 
   
Sizeloose -0.145 -0.410 -0.448 0.0167 -0.233 -0.225 
 
(0.272) (0.314) (0.309) (0.316) (0.358) (0.353) 
Govnetlend -5.16e-05 8.01e-05 6.90e-06 2.22e-05 0.000163 6.15e-05 
 
(0.00107) (0.00113) (0.00103) (0.00106) (0.00112) (0.00102) 
Pubdebt -0.000281* -0.000309* -0.000366** -0.000270* -0.000290* -0.000339** 
 
(0.000158) (0.000167) (0.000156) (0.000159) (0.000167) (0.000156) 
Outputgap 0.00334* 0.00383** 0.00339** 0.00331* 0.00398** 0.00358** 
 (0.00174) (0.00184) (0.00150) (0.00174) (0.00184) (0.00148) 
Numbertight    -0.0280** -0.0146 -0.0115 
 
   (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0108) 
Numbertightsq    0.00417 -0.00128 -0.00169 
    (0.00451) (0.00494) (0.00446) 
numberloose    0.0184 0.0348** 0.0402*** 
 
   (0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0150) 
Numberloosesq    -0.00878 -0.0134** -0.0158** 
 
   (0.00605) (0.00650) (0.00616) 
Constant 0.0822*** 0.0973*** 0.0804*** 0.0975*** 0.0945*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0271) (0.0255) (0.0261) (0.0271) (0.0249) 
       
Countries-Observations 15-462 15-457 15-462 15-462 15-457 15-462 
Overall R2 0.965 0.973 0.976 0.966 0.973 0.977 
Time and or Year Dummies 
Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. -   The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” -  a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -  b: The 
model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.-   c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -       d: The model is “error 
dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 9: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in G7 Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007  
 
 1d 2d 3d 4d 5d 6d 
 ODA ODARelief NAT ODA ODARelief NAT 
Estimators LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs 
Regressors       
 
      
Epfa 0.00294 -0.00213 0.00595    
 
(0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
   
Sizetight -0.544** -0.639** -0.627** -0.612* -0.741** -0.682** 
 
(0.257) (0.287) (0.282) (0.333) (0.341) (0.337) 
Epfs -0.00566 0.00660 -0.000562    
 
(0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
   
Sizeloose -0.351 -0.426 -0.362 -0.108 -0.125 -0.0865 
 
(0.304) (0.317) (0.302) (0.345) (0.361) (0.352) 
Govnetlend -0.00649*** -0.00671*** -0.00660*** -0.00545** -0.00641*** -0.00625*** 
 
(0.00230) (0.00227) (0.00211) (0.00224) (0.00230) (0.00213) 
Pubdebt 0.000202 0.000212 -0.000296 0.000232 0.000242 -0.000258 
 
(0.000309) (0.000298) (0.000254) (0.000325) (0.000294) (0.000254) 
Outputgap -0.000588 0.00215 0.00132 -0.00118 0.00197 0.00106 
 
(0.00257) (0.00263) (0.00259) (0.00205) (0.00265) (0.00260) 
Numbertight    -0.00347 -0.00650 0.00240 
 
   (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0131) 
Numbertightsq    0.000557 0.000638 -0.000473 
 
   (0.00493) (0.00506) (0.00494) 
Numberloose    -0.0131 -0.000793 -0.0107 
 
   (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
Numberloosesq    0.000458 -0.00248 0.000479 
 
   (0.00604) (0.00607) (0.00579) 
 
      
Constant 0.309*** 0.156*** 0.116** 0.168*** 0.0632 0.459*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0452) (0.0378) (0.0460) (0.0348) 
 
      
Countries-Observations 7-230 7-230 7-230 7-230 7-230 7-230 
Overall R2 0.777 0.703 0.780 0.783 0.682 0.758 
Time and or Year Dummies 
Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. - The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
         a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -   b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent   
variable. -  c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -   d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged 
values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 10: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in « Like-Minded Donor Countries » on aid disbursements, 1970-2007 
 1b 2d 3d 4b 5d 6d 
 ODA ODARelief NAT ODA ODARelief NAT 
Estimators LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs 
Variables       
 
      
Aidt-1 0.837***   0.834***   
 
(0.0323)   (0.0310)   
Epfa -0.0452*** -0.0141 -0.0112    
 
(0.0125) (0.0147) (0.0149) 
   
Sizetight -0.00530 0.253 0.282 0.311 -0.0899 -0.0566 
 
(0.280) (0.295) (0.296) (0.354) (0.453) (0.458) 
Epfs 0.0106 0.0428** 0.0423**    
 
(0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0196)    
Sizeloose 0.192 -0.356 -0.404 1.389*** 0.557 0.465 
 
(0.449) (0.452) (0.464) (0.461) (0.582) (0.601) 
Govnetlend 0.000140 -0.00505* -0.00501* -0.000954 -0.00557* -0.00554* 
 
(0.00160) (0.00284) (0.00286) (0.00151) (0.00293) (0.00297) 
Pubdebt 5.58e-05 0.000566 0.000601 0.000141 0.000795* 0.000812* 
 
(0.000271) (0.000434) (0.000438) (0.000255) (0.000446) (0.000452) 
Outputgap 0.00155 0.00174 0.00216 0.00252 0.00233 0.00282 
 (0.00255) (0.00435) (0.00439) (0.00242) (0.00454) (0.00459) 
Numbertight    -0.0547*** -0.0169 -0.0130 
 
   (0.0144) (0.0182) (0.0184) 
Numbertightsq    0.0156*** -0.00155 -0.00238 
    (0.00571) (0.00791) (0.00798) 
Numberloose    0.0488** 0.0582** 0.0568** 
 
   (0.0228) (0.0258) (0.0260) 
Numberloosesq    -0.0425*** -0.0345*** -0.0329** 
    (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
Constant  0.352*** 0.742***  0.516*** 0.327*** 
  (0.0689) (0.0708)  (0.0624) (0.0697) 
       
Countries – Obs 5-172 5-172 5-172 5-172 5-172 5-172 
Overall R2 0.970 0.940 0.935 0.977 0.924 0.915 
Time and /or Year Dummies Significance YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
              The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable”-  a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
            b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.- c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent 
variable. -  d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oda 722 .387875 .2486271 0 1.040209 
Odarelief 698 .3834206 .237751 .0123208 1.040209 
Nat 722 .3662615 .2445341 0 1.033615 
Epfa 653 .151608 .3589154 0 1 
Epfs 653 .1301685 .3367466 0 1 
Beforeepfa 653 .1163859 .320933 0 1 
Beforeepfs 704 .0909091 .2876842 0 1 
Afterepfs 706 .0906516 .2873165 0 1 
Numbertight 653 .194487 .519999 0 4 
Numbertightsq 653 .3078101 1.195037 0 16 
Numberloose 653 .1653905 .4734319 0 3 
Numberloosesq 653 .2511485 .9615392 0 9 
Sizetight 653 -.0036348 .0124179 -.1528607 0 
Sizeloose 653 .0034784 .0122828 0 .107214 
Govnetlend 690 -2.192955 4.329945 -16.00805 18.48245 
Pubdebtimf 712 52.32846 29.10584 0 191.6414 
Outputgap 644 -.1337252 2.141367 -8.722275 6.514374 
Icrgqog 456 .9006301 .0986974 .5231482 1 
Lpop 722 16.72196 1.261909 14.85225 19.52358 
Cold 722 .5526316 .4975669 0 1 
Bankingcrises 722 .0360111 .1864469 0 1 
Reer 718 97.74612 13.26922 48.33874 144.7275 
Inflation 700 5.809362 5.102501 -9.628535 28.78333 
Trade 722 62.57673 31.46253 11.25685 184.7421 
Politicalorientation 722 1.889197 .9719618 0 3 
Unemployment 499 7.641683 3.881486 1.6 23.9 
Lrgdp 722 10.10172 .4258751 8.500455 11.3186 
Elec 722 .3060942 .4611888 0 1 
Yearbeforeelec 722 .2880886 .4531865 0 1 
Welfareinst 542 27.28105 7.545462 11.03529 45.37803 
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APPENDIX 2:  Description of Maddala (1987) Test   
Consider the following model: 
, , 1 ,i t i t i i ty y uβ α−= + +   (1). Maddala (1987) suggests 
that an important issue that arises in dynamic models is that of “serial correlation” versus 
“state dependence”, that is, whether any direct effects of the dependent variable exist apart 
from those generate indirectly by the serial correlation of the errors. Alternative terminology 
for the “serial correlation model” versus “state-dependence model” is model with “error 
dynamics” and “system dynamics”, respectively. To clarify this problem, consider a single 
cross-section unit where we drop the subscript I (this issue is not special to panel data and 
concerns also the usual regression models as well). For example, consider the regression 
model with no lagged variables, but serially correlated errors: 
1
t t t
t t t
y x u
u x e
β
ρ
−
= +

= +
   
We can write it as  1 1t t t t ty y x x eβ β ρβ− −= + − +  (2). The model in (2) is the same as 
the dynamic regression equation: (3) 1 0 1t t t t ty y x x eγ β ρβ− −= + − +  with the restriction
0 1 0γβ β+ = . The two models thus differ in this restriction. If the restriction 0 1 0γβ β+ =  
holds, the apparent effect of 1ty − on ty is due to serial correlation in the errors. On the other 
hand, if this restriction does not hold, then 1ty −  has an effect on ty  and we have what is 
known as « state-dependence ». Thus an estimate of Equation (3) and a test of the restriction 
0 1 0γβ β+ =  will enable us to discrimate between the “serial correlation model” and the “state 
dependence model”. 
Summing up, the proper procedure is to first estimate Equation (3) and test for the 
restriction 0 1 0γβ β+ = . If this is not rejected, then we test for serial correlation by testing
0ρ = . Thus, the test for the serial correlation should be undertaken after we have determined 
that what we have is perhaps a serial correlation model. The use of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic at the beginning is not a correct procedure.  
Returning to the case of panel data, the “serial correlation model” and the “state-
dependence model” corresponding to Equation (4):  '
, ,i t i t i ity x uβ α= + +  are:  
The serial correlation model:
'
, ,
, , 1
i t i t i it
i t i t it
y x u
u
β α
ω ρω
−
 = + +

= +
 ;     
The State dependence model: '
, , 1 ,i t i t i t i ity y x uρ β α−− = + + . 
